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The Regulatory Response to Madoff
Anita K. Krug
In the aftermath of Bernard Madoff’s revelation that his investment management business had for years
been a ponzi scheme, regulators and commentators have turned to the question of whether and how the
present regulatory regime is adequate to protect investors. In that context, many have asserted that hedge
funds and/or their managers—and/or their respective activities—should be subject to additional regulation
or otherwise to more stringent regulatory oversight.
It is worth considering, then, whether that call for additional regulation is warranted. What is the problem
with hedge funds that leads regulators and other commentators to think that hedge funds’ activities
warrant additional external oversight?
Protecting investors through correcting information discrepancies was the predicate of the regulation that
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act”) imposes on mutual funds and
other registered investment companies. The objective behind that regulation was to provide fund
investors and prospective investors with information they need to make informed decisions about their
fund investments, avoid or minimize investment risk and portfolio losses, and maintain the integrity of
investment companies’ operations, thereby minimizing fraud and misappropriation of investor assets. If
the goal arising from the Madoff fraud is to better protect investors in hedge funds and other private
funds,1 and if hedge funds’ operations evince information dispersion problems similar to those leading to
the enactment of the Investment Company Act, then looking to the model of regulation established by the
Investment Company Act may be an appropriate first step.
The Investment Company Act requires funds registered under that Act, including mutual funds, to comply
with certain substantive requirements. Among other things, each mutual fund and other registered
investment company must have a majority-independent board of directors, adhere to specific
requirements relating to safeguarding portfolio assets, comply with extensive rules in selling its shares,
obtain shareholder approval of numerous specified activities and transactions, and maintain and comply
with an array of operational policies and procedures. In addition, the Investment Company Act generally
requires registered investment companies to value their portfolios on a daily basis using readily available
market quotations (or otherwise at fair value, in the board’s determination) and strictly limits the amount
of leverage a mutual fund may employ. Moreover, mutual funds generally must permit their shareholders
to redeem shares whenever the shareholders choose and are also subject to significant SEC filing
obligations and disclosure requirements.
And, investment advisers to mutual funds and other registered investment companies must be registered
as such under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”). Under that
regulatory regime, an investment adviser must submit a registration application with the SEC (and update
the information on that application on at least an annual basis) and comply with the Advisers Act and the
rules under that Act.2 Among other things, a registered investment adviser must appoint a “chief

1

Neither Madoff nor his investment advisory firm apparently formally operated any hedge funds.
However, several hedge funds — including so-called “feeder” funds — apparently did place capital with
Madoff. In addition, Madoff’s professed investment strategy was characteristic of certain types of
strategies that hedge funds pursue.
2

This regulatory regime already covers some hedge fund managers (those that either cannot avail
themselves of an exemption from that registration or that have become registered voluntarily). It was also
the regime to which the SEC subjected hedge fund managers when it adopted the rules under the Advisers
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compliance officer” and adopt an array of compliance policies and procedures that are reasonably
designed to ensure the adviser’s and its associated persons’ compliance with federal securities laws,
including a “code of ethics” requiring the adviser’s employees to submit to the adviser initial and annual
securities holdings reports and quarterly reports detailing their transactions in most securities during the
preceding quarter. In addition, the SEC staff “examines” each registered adviser approximately every
four years. In those examinations, the examiners visit the adviser’s premises for several days, ask
questions of the adviser’s personnel about the adviser’s business activities and procedures, and review the
adviser’s books and records.
It is conceivable that requiring hedge funds to comply with some of the restrictions and obligations the
Investment Company Act imposes on registered investment funds could reduce certain risks deemed to
arise from hedge funds, particularly those associated with the goal of investor protection. The Madoff
fraud, after all, showed that hedge fund investors may fall victim to fraud of grand proportions, and it may
seem that regulators should follow suit with the sort of focused and encompassing investor protection
measures that have been in place as to mutual funds and other registered investment companies for
decades. That conclusion is probably not warranted, however.
The pertinent differences between mutual funds and hedge funds for this analysis are (at least) twofold:
First, hedge fund investors are different from mutual fund and other “retail” fund investors, both in terms
of their financial “qualifications” and in terms of their relationships to the funds in which they invest. At
a minimum, hedge fund investors must be “accredited,” as defined under Regulation D of the Securities
Act of 1933, as amended, and, for many hedge funds, investors must also be “qualified purchasers”—that
is, they must own at least $5 million (for individuals) or $25 million (for entities) in “investments.” In
addition, because hedge funds are offered privately, in many (if not most) cases, investors have
relationships with the managers of the funds in which they invest and also have the opportunity to request
from those managers whatever information the investors require to evaluate their proposed hedge fund
investments. As compared with investors in mutual funds and other publicly-offered investment funds,
then, investors in hedge funds generally are able to look out for their own interests and fend for
themselves.
Second, hedge funds are essentially defined by their flexibility to pursue the universe of alternative
investments, which, in turn, depends on their being generally free from restrictive portfolio investment
requirements, such as those to which registered investment companies are subject. That flexibility to
make non-traditional investments is widely regarded as the basis of hedge funds’ value to investors and to
the capital markets. Among other things, hedge funds’ diverse strategies offer investors opportunities for
portfolio diversification. In addition, by serving as counterparties in myriad financial transactions, hedge
funds serve to increase liquidity in the markets. Depending on their investment strategies, hedge funds
have played dominant roles as parties to swap and other derivative instrument contracts, as buyers and
sellers of illiquid securities and other instruments not readily transferable in open market transactions, as
sources of capital to public companies, by participating in those companies’ private securities issuances,
and as lenders of capital to parties that otherwise may be unable to obtain credit. Hedge funds have also
assumed roles as activist shareholders, willing to play activist roles in companies in their portfolios in
situations in which smaller investors may not have sufficient incentives or resources to do so. Indeed,
hedge funds’ value to investors and contributions to the marketplace may explain hedge funds’ critics’
seeking merely to regulate hedge funds (and/or their managers) rather than to eliminate them completely.
Because of the different relationships and attributes of hedge fund investors (as compared with mutual
fund investors) and the role that hedge funds have come to assume in the capital markets, seeking investor
Act (that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently invalidated) that had required many hedge fund
managers to become registered under that Act.
The Regulatory Response to Madoff
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682610

2

protection through mutual fund-like regulation is likely not the best path to address possible regulatory
deficiencies.
Beyond that, investment adviser regulation along the lines of the current investment adviser registration
regime arguably would not be particularly effective in detecting and preventing the worst sorts of
misdeeds, such as Madoff’s. Among other things, effective detection and prevention of “bad acts”
requires regulators to actually know about managers’ day-to-day activities—for example, to monitor the
accuracy of a manager’s communications with investors and the validity of its portfolio valuations and to
learn whether the manager is improperly trading on information from broker-dealers or other
counterparties or whether its employees are taking advantage of transactions contemplated for the
manager’s clients (which are the funds it manages). But that level of knowledge and oversight is not
something the current federal investment adviser regulatory regime contemplates. Adviser examinations
historically have occurred only on an infrequent basis, and those examinations have not proven effective
in detecting the worst violations. Case in point, fraud allegations are usually brought to the SEC’s
attention not through its periodic on-site examinations of investment advisers but through investor or
client complaints.
This is not to say that there may not be some other type of regulation that would be appropriate to correct
whatever information deficiencies may have become apparent in the wake of the Madoff fraud and
instances of fraud by hedge fund managers. A few possible regulatory approaches—less comprehensive
than the full panoply of Investment Company Act regulations—come to mind. For example,
policymakers could require hedge funds and possibly other private funds to appoint independent boards of
directors to oversee and review fund transactions or to submit to regulators information about material
contracts, risks, service providers, investment strategies and limitations, and so on, on a periodic basis. It
may also be that funds’ financial sophistication standards, or at least the “accredited investor” standard, is
worth revisiting, given that it was established in the early 1980s and has not subsequently been adjusted
to reflect inflation or other subsequent developments.3 Another approach, which some commentators
have already proposed, would be to require hedge funds to use independent custodians, brokers,
administrators, accountants, and other service providers.
But the regulatory proposal that has been most widely embraced for tackling hedge fund fraud involves
great requiring greater “transparency” of private funds and/or their managers. Calls for hedge fund
regulation often center on the notion that hedge funds should disclose details concerning their operations
and activities (including in some cases leverage and portfolio positions) to investors, counterparties and
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In late 2006, the SEC proposed to revise Regulation D to establish a new category of accredited
investor—the “accredited natural person.” As proposed, natural persons would have to qualify as
accredited natural persons in order to invest in hedge funds that rely on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment
Company Act to be excluded from the definition of “investment company” as defined in that Act. To be
an accredited natural person, an investor would need to be an accredited investor and own at least $2.5
million in “investments.” In proposing the change, the SEC cited its concern that hedge fund investors
may need additional protections in light of hedge funds’ “unique risks” and its perception that the new
standard would be a more objective means of determining whether an investor is sufficiently
knowledgeable and experienced in finance and business to properly evaluate the investment. In addition,
in August 2007, the SEC proposed adding an alternative “investments-owned” standard to the accredited
investor definition and establishing a mechanism to adjust the dollar-amount thresholds in the accredited
investor definition based on inflation, with the first adjustment occurring in 2012. As yet, the SEC has
not adopted either of these proposals.
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creditors, and/or regulators so that investors may better evaluate the appropriateness of their investments
in light of their particular investment goals and so that other market participants may better evaluate the
systemic risks that hedge funds pose. Among other commentaries, the reports of the Asset Managers’
Committee to the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets have focused on transparency,
recommending that hedge funds disclose certain aspects of their operations, business terms, portfolio
characteristics, and policies and procedures to investors, counterparties, and/or creditors.
When one parses the arguments for transparency, it becomes evident that different constituencies want
different types of “transparency.” From the standpoint of investor protection, “transparency” generally
seems to refer to how a fund operates, what its performance has been, how its portfolio assets are valued,
the terms on which investors may redeem interests, and the extent to which its assets are liquid or
relatively illiquid.
This type of transparency is not new for hedge funds and other private funds. Particularly in light of an
increasing institutionalization of hedge funds’ investors bases, hedge funds and other private funds have
routinely disclosed their business terms (the terms on which investors may subscribe for and redeem
interests), conflicts of interests to which the manager and other service providers may be subject,
valuation policies, investment strategies and goals, and other information arguably material to investors’
decisions to invest. Likewise, it has been relatively commonplace for hedge funds and/or their managers
to communicate periodically (usually monthly or quarterly) with investors, and those communications
typically describe the funds’ recent performance and investment outlook.
If funds industry-wide have not voluntarily adopted that level of disclosure, arguably they should. But if
some type of disclosure is to be regulatorily mandated—as discussed below, that should be a live
question—then there remains the further question of just what categories of information should be
required to be disclosed and, perhaps just as important, to whom should it be disclosed.
Regarding the first question, presumably funds should at least disclose the sort of information currently
disclosed by hedge funds adhering to the disclosure practices described above. Other possible candidates
for disclosure might be funds’ portfolio positions and concentrations and, perhaps, the amount of leverage
employed.
Evaluating whether regulatorily mandated disclosure would reduce or mitigate fraud, of course, depends
on what data or information investors need to make informed investment decisions but do not request or
otherwise do not obtain. Perhaps among the most important information, beyond the categories already
noted, is information concerning performance returns and the identities of those persons—auditors,
administrators, and other service providers—who should have verified those returns and the accuracy of
funds’ and managers’ statements about investment activities.
The parameters of disclosure requirements should not be left to speculation, however. Empirical data
would be useful in defining the contours of required disclosure, and, toward that end, exploring prior
fraud cases may prove fruitful. That is, policymakers and regulators should take action (if any) based on
an understanding of what types of information defrauded investors should have had to avoid the fraud but
were not able to obtain or otherwise did not obtain.
As for the second question—to whom should funds be required to disclose information—two possibilities
are readily apparent: Funds could be required to make disclosures either to investors only or to both
regulators and investors. As discussed above, requiring that certain types of disclosures be made to
investors would effectively make mandatory a version—perhaps a more robust and comprehensive
version—of the disclosure that funds and/or their managers already frequently provide to investors and
prospective investors.
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If funds and/or managers were required to make these disclosures to the SEC or other designated
regulators, there would arise some additional considerations and questions. The primary one is whether
any or part of the disclosed information would be publicly available and, if so, how that information
might affect private funds’ status as private offerors of their interests: Would, for example, a private
fund’s disclosure to the SEC of information about its business terms, performance, and investment
strategies and activities eliminate the “private” character of the fund’s offering, with the effect (one
among many) that the fund would need to become registered as an investment company under the
Investment Company Act? Even if the information were not to be made available to public—which
would require regulators to rely on an exemption from that disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act (“FOIA”)—might the public be able to challenge that reliance and perhaps succeed in nonetheless
requiring disclosure? Recent experience demonstrates that that result is a viable possibility: Forms SH,
on which “institutional investment managers” (which includes certain hedge funds managers) must
disclose their clients’ short selling activities are not, under the SEC’s “interim temporary final rule” that
implemented the disclosure requirement, to become publicly available, with the SEC relying on FOIA
exemption in order to take that position. However, members of the public have challenged the
confidentiality that permitted by FOIA’s exemptions, and it is within comprehension to expect that
similar requests would arise in connection with other disclosures that funds or their managers may be
required to make to regulators. To be sure, the prospect of public disclosure is more or less ominous
depending on the information sought to be disclosed. Information relating to investment strategies and
positions is arguably the most sensitive.
In this context it is also worth considering the question of whether the requirement to disclose—whether
to investors only or also to regulators—would deter hedge fund managers’ activities. As with any
regulation, disclosure requirements would carry compliance costs, arising from, among other things,
understanding the disclosure requirements, ensuring compliance with them, and responding to or
otherwise addressing regulators’ monitoring of that compliance. For some managers, those costs may
exceed the benefits of continuing their businesses. In addition, to the extent managers are concerned that
others may discover the ingredients to their “secret sauces” as a result of their disclosing information
about their activities and the activities of the funds they manage, managers may have fewer incentives to
pursue those activities. The more the information disclosed is of the “sensitive” type, the greater that risk
becomes.
To the extent policymakers set about to formulate proposals that might require augmented disclosure,
then, they should do so based in part on data about the likely effects of those requirements on hedge
funds’ and managers’ activities. After all, much as investors may need to be protected, there remains a
role for private funds in the capital markets and, particularly in light of the precipitous decline in their
number and assets in them that commentators have forecasted for months, it would be worth ensuring that
the hedge fund industry remains viable.
The best means of obtaining this data is not obvious, however. Beyond conducting surveys of hedge fund
managers about those managers’ likely reactions to heightened disclosure (which may be of questionable
reliability), researchers might evaluate the effects of the implementation of existing disclosure regimes.
One example in this regard may be state FOIA laws that members of the public have used to require
certain public entities, such as public pension plans and university endowments, to disclose information
about their investments in venture capital and other private equity funds, including information that may
reasonably be deemed proprietary commercial information of those funds.4
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In response to those disclosure requirements, some private equity fund groups, in addition to
resisting complying with those disclosure requests, began declining capital from public investors.
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Policymakers should consider something else as well: If the Madoff fraud pointed out deficiencies in
regulations applicable to private funds and/or their managers, that fraud itself, much better than additional
regulation, may well be the answer to any perceived regulatory gap. After all, arguably investors that
invest in hedge funds and other private funds, more than perhaps investors placing capital into mutual
funds and other Investment Company Act-regulated funds, generally understand that hedge funds and
other private funds are not subject to the extensive regulation that the Investment Company Act imposes
on mutual funds and other regulated investment funds and that the responsibility for understanding the
nature of their fund investments and the associated risks belong solely to the investors and/or their
representatives.
Accordingly, it is at least conceivable that, in the wake of the Madoff and other frauds, investors may
substantially increase the procedures they follow in understanding their investments and the managers in
charge of them. They may deploy more time toward, and employ more diligence in, assuring themselves
that the funds in which they have invested or may invest use independent custodians and other service
providers, understanding the investment strategies pursuant to which their capital will be managed, and
making investment decisions based on their own analyses and evaluations. In short, before mandating
that funds and/or their managers comply with disclosure requirements, policymakers should consider the
prospect that these investors and other market participants may, through heightened diligence and deeper
research, themselves be the correction to perceived information problems and their own best defense in
avoiding becoming victims of future frauds.
Toward that end, policymakers should consider whether data can be obtained that suggests how, if at all,
investor practices may be changing after Madoff. One approach in this regard may be to survey
investment managers regarding questions investors are asking, and another would be to survey investors
themselves. Ideally, through those surveys, policymakers might gather data sufficient to learn what
information investors are most interested in obtaining and how they would use or are using that
information.
Obtaining that sort of data would be productive first step before moving forward with additional “investor
protection” legislation and rulemaking. If policymakers proceed to a further step of mandating disclosure,
then, as discussed above, that project should involve its own data gathering. The aspiration of investor
protection legislation, after all, is to correct information imbalances and not to eliminate the benefits
arising from hedge funds’ roles in the markets.
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